March 17, 2004

Centralised Insecurity

What surprises me is that no-one is asking why we think the government can do a better job with centralised security than the rest of us can do by ourselves. Whoops! Spoke to soon - Bruce Schneier writes about exactly that in
Security Risks of Centralization
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Security Risks of Centralization

In discussions with Brill, he regularly said things like: "It's obviously better to do something than nothing." Actually, it's not obvious. Replacing several decentralized security systems with a single centralized security system can actually reduce the overall security, even though the new system is more secure than the systems being replaced.

An example will make this clear. I'll postulate piles of money secured by individual systems. The systems are characterized by the cost to break them. A $100 pile of money secured by a $200 system is secure, since it's not worth the cost to break. A $100 pile of money secured by a $50 system is insecure, since an attacker can make $50 profit by breaking the security and stealing the money.

Here's my example. There are 10 $100 piles, each secured by individual $200 security systems. They're all secure. There are another 10 $100 piles, each secured by individual $50 systems. They're all insecure.

Clearly something must be done.

One suggestion is to replace all the individual security systems by a single centralized system. The new system is much better than the ones being replaced; it's a $500 system.

Unfortunately, the new system won't provide more security. Under the old systems, 10 piles of money could be stolen at a cost of $50 per pile; an attacker would realize a total profit of $500. Under the new system, we have 20 $100 piles all secured by a single $500 system. An attacker now has an incentive to break that more-secure system, since he can steal $2000 by spending $500 -- a profit of $1500.

The problem is centralization. When individual security systems are combined in one centralized system, the incentive to break that new system is generally higher. Even though the centralized system may be harder to break than any of the individual systems, if it is easier to break than ALL of the individual systems, it may result in less security overall.

There is a security benefit to decentralized security.

Posted by iang at March 17, 2004 12:08 PM | TrackBack
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